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BEFORE THE COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE

JUDGE DOROTHY J. VAUGHN DOCKETS NO. 94-8, 94-64, 94-74 95-44
AND 95-56

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

        The Formal Charges in this matter arise principally
from Respondent's conduct in seven (7) different cases, as
well as her unprofessional and discourteous behavior towards
Court personnel. The factual basis supporting each alleged
act of misconduct will be detailed hereinbelow and in summary
conclusively shows:

(i) a pattern of repeated legal error demonstrating
professional incompetence, including the absolute denial of
basic and fundamental constitutional rights resulting in the
unlawful incarceration and illegal detention of two (2)
individual citizens for periods of 48 and 96 hours,
respectively, in cases where such individuals were entitled
to bail as a matter of law; and a blatant attempt to force
individuals to enter guilty pleas in the absence of counsel;

(ii) a pattern of repeated indecorous and discourteous
behavior towards litigants,
attorneys, court personnel and others appearing in court
characterized by impatience, sarcasm and intemperance;

(iii) a steadfast refusal to communicate with litigants
attorneys and others appearing in court; and

(iv) a pattern of unexplained, abrupt and often unexpected
departures from the bench with the resultant delay in
judicial proceedings.

A .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE <<Note 1 - For the convenience of the
Court, a copy of the Notice of Formal Proceedings is attached
to this filing as Appendix "A.">>



        This matter originated on June 30, 1993 when Hunter S.
Allen, Jr., an experienced Atlanta trial attorney, filed a
formal complaint with the Commission alleging numerous
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and charging Judge
Dorothy J. Vaughn, a sitting judge of the State Court of
Fulton County, Georgia ("Respondent") with bizarre,
intemperate, inconsiderate, mean-spirited, and incompetent
behavior during the trial of an extended medical malpractice
case which ultimately resulted in a mistrial. [R. 1 to 155
"Allen Complaint," Docket No. 94-8].

        By letter dated July 26, 1993, the Commission provided
a copy of the Allen complaint to Respondent and requested any
comments she deemed appropriate. [R. 156]. Respondent's
initial comment letter, in which Respondent generally denied
all allegations of the Allen complaint and requested
permission to reserve comments upon specific allegations
pending receipt of a trial transcript (estimated as September
1993), was received by the Commission on August 9, 1993. [R.
157 - 158]. By letter dated August 23, 1993, Mr. Allen
submitted an amendment to his original complaint alleging
Respondent's refusal to respond to communications concerning
her voluntary refusal from another case in which Mr. Allen
was counsel. R. 159 - 160]. A copy of this additional
complaint was forwarded to Respondent by letter dated
September 2, 1993, and Respondent was advised that her
request to delay a response to the original complaint had
been granted, but requested to promptly respond to the
additional complaint. Said letter also advised Respondent of
the voluntary refusal of Judge Alice D. Bonner pursuant to an
informal request of Respondent's then counsel, Marvin S.
Arrington, Esq. [R. 161].


        By letter dated September 27, 1993, Respondent's
counsel advised that Respondent had voluntarily recused
herself as requested [R. 162 - 163], and no further action
was taken respecting this complaint.

        On November 22, 1993, Atlanta attorney Rees R. Smith
filed a formal complaint with the Commission alleging
generally that Respondent refused to permit attorneys to
address the Court concerning a bond forfeiture during a
calendar call and subsequently refused to see or discuss the
matter with counsel. CR. 164 to 169 - "Smith Complaint,"
Docket No. 94-64]. By letter dated January 31, 1994, the
Commission provided a copy of the Smith complaint to
Respondent and requested any comments she deemed appropriate.
[R. 170]. By letter dated February 15, 1994, Respondent's
counsel denied the allegations of the Smith complaint, urging
that no violation of the Code had been shown. [R. 171].

        On January 18, 1994, Mr. Julian George Reeder, a
defendant in a criminal action, filed a formal complaint with
the Commission alleging generally that he appeared in
Respondent's court for trial as ordered on April 20, 1993,
and when his counsel was unable to appear due to personal
problems, Respondent refused Mr. Reeder's request for a
delay; called his case for trial without counsel being
present; and subsequently forfeited his bond, although he was
physically present in court. Mr. Reeder further alleged that
when his attorney later appeared, Respondent refused to hear
from counsel and subsequently ordered Mr. Reeder's arrest and
required him to post a second bond. R. 172 to 182 - Reeder
Complaint," Docket No. 94-74]. A copy of the Reeder complaint
was provided to Respondent by letter dated January 31, 1994.
[R. 183], and the allegations were generally denied by
Respondent's counsel in a letter dated February 15, 1994.
[R. 184].


        By letter dated February 28, 1994, Respondent was
notified that the above described complaints had been
consolidated and would be investigated by the Commission.
Still having received no reply to the original Allen
complaint, Respondent was again requested to provide the same
and advised of her rights under Commission Rule 4. [R. 185 -
186].

        Due to inordinate delays in the preparation of the
trial transcript (11 volumes, 2200 pgs.), Respondent's
response to the original Allen complaint was not received
until May 26, 1994, when a consolidated response to the
Allen, Smith and Reeder complaints, as well as a request for
a Rule 4(d) conference, was received. [R. 187 - 192].

        The initial investigation of these matters occurred
during the period March 1 through May 31, 1994, and the Rule
4 conference requested by Respondent was held on September
30, 1994. Following the conference and by letter dated
October 5, 1994, Respondent's counsel submitted a written
summary of comments made by the Respondent during the Rule 4
conference.

[R. 193 - 195].

        In the meantime, and on September 20, 1994, Atlanta
Attorney Robert W. Chestney filed yet another formal
complaint generally charging Respondent with numerous acts of
misconduct in the handling of a criminal case, including a
refusal to set an appeal bond on a misdemeanor conviction;
refusal to see an attorney respecting the same necessitating
an emergency appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals; and
additional delay in complying with an emergency order issued
by the Court of Appeals. [R. 196 to 212  - "Chestney
Complaint," Docket No. 95-44]. A copy of this complaint was
forwarded to Respondent by letter dated October 31, 1994, and
once again, Respondent requested a delay in responding while
awaiting receipt of a trial transcript. [R. 213 - 214]. By
letter dated October 31, 1994, Respondent's request for a
delay was denied. [R. 220 - 221].

        On the same date, Respondent was provided with a copy
of yet another complaint filed by Atlanta Attorney William C.
Head and her comments requested. [R. 219]. The Head complaint
alleged several acts of misconduct by Respondent in the
handling of a criminal misdemeanor cases including delaying
the imposition of sentence for more than one (1) year;
refusing to set an appeal bond; refusing to rule on motions;
and demeaning the attorney. [R. 215 to 218 - "Head
Complaint," Docket No. 95-56].

        A Rule 4 conference respecting the Chestney and Head
complaints was offered to Respondent by letter dated October
31, 1994 [R. 220 - 221], but no such conference was requested
and Respondent never provided written comments respecting
either of these complaints.

        Notice of Formal Proceedings, together with all
documents required by Commission Rule 8(a), was hand
delivered to Respondent's counsel on December 12, 1994. [R.
222 - 228]. By Order dated December 13, 1994 and pursuant to
Commission Rule 2(f), Judge Hugh Lawson was appointed to
preside and rule upon all questions in this matter, and a
copy of such Order was provided to counsel by letter dated
December 15, 1994. [R. 229 - 230].

        By Order dated December 19, 1994, and pursuant to
Commission Rule l(d), Superior Court Judge Walter C.
McMillan, Jr., a former Commission member from the same
category, was appointed to substitute at the Formal Hearing
and subsequent actions in lieu of Judge Alice D. Bonner, and
a copy of this Order was provided to counsel by letter dated
December 29, 1994. [R. 231 - 232].

        By Order dated January 3, 1995, the designated
Presiding Judge specially set the matter for Formal Hearing
on Monday, February 20, 1995; directed that certain pre-
hearing materials be filed by fixed dates; and set the matter
for a pre-hearing conference on February 17, 1995. Copies of
this Order were provided to counsel by facsimile and U.S.
Mail on January 3, 1995. [R. 233 - 236].

        In an unverified letter dated January 11, 1995,
Respondent generally denied all allegations in the Notice of
Formal Proceedings and requested that all correspondence be
forwarded to her additional counsel, Tony L. Axam, Esq. [R.
237]. By letter dated January 31, 1995, Respondent's formal
verified answer was belatedly filed, together with a Motion
to Change the Scheduling. [R. 238 - 249]. Said Motion was
denied by Order dated February 3, 1995. [R. 250 - 252].

        On February 16, 1995, Respondent filed an Extraordinary
Motion in the Supreme Court seeking to stay this proceeding
and to recuse the entire Commission. [R. 253 273]. By letter
faxed to the Clerk of the Supreme Court on February 17, 1995,
the Commission responded to said Motion [R. 274 - 283], and
by Order dated February 17, 1995, the Motion was dismissed
without prejudice to Respondent's right to file the same with
the Commission. [R. 284].

        Respondent's Pre-trial Submission was untimely filed on
February 17, 1995 during the pre-hearing conference, as were
various motions concerning the suppression and/or exclusion
of certain evidence. [R. 285 - 321]. A complete transcript of
the Pre-trial Hearing is included as a separate document in
the materials being transmitted to this Court simultaneously
with this pleading.

        At the outset of the Formal Hearing on February 20,
1995, an Entry of Appearance was filed by Messrs. Thomas E.
Cauthorn, III and B. Wayne Phillips as additional attorneys
of record for the Respondent. [R. 322 - 323]. Filed
simultaneously therewith was a second Motion to Recuse and
Brief in Support [R. 324 - 339] which, after argument of
counsel, was denied. [R. 340]. Respondent's proposed
Certificate of Immediate Review was denied [R. 341], but an
Order permitting review of said ruling without depriving the
Commission of jurisdiction was filed on February 21, 1995.
[R. 342].

        On February 21, 1995, Respondent filed a Petition for
Immediate Review [R. 343 - 380] and a Motion for Emergency
Stay in the Supreme Court. [R. 381 to 383]. The Motion for
Emergency Stay was denied on February 21, 1995 [R. 384] and
the "petition for immediate review" was denied on February
22, 1995. [R. 385]. <<Note 2 - These Findings and
Recommendations purposely do not address the recusal issue
because, as noted by the Texas Supreme Court, "... any
alleged partiality of the Commission is cured by the final
scrutiny of this adjudicative body." In Re Brown, 512 S.W. 2d
317 (Tex. 1974); cited with approval in In Re Nowell, 237
S.E. 2d 246 (N.C. 1977). See also: Confidential Excerpt - FHT
630 - 650.>>

        The Formal Hearing commenced on Monday, February 20,
1995 and concluded on Sunday, February 26, 1995, at
approximately 2:00 P.M. A complete transcript of this hearing
(1712 pages), together with some 37 JQC exhibits and 10
Respondent exhibits, is included in the materials being
transmitted to the Clerk simultaneously with this pleading.
This transcript will hereinafter be cited as [FHT p.  ].

        At the conclusion of the Formal Hearing, counsel were
directed to submit written arguments and copies of the same
are contained in the record CR. 386 - 442 ]. Oral arguments
were heard on April 28, 1995, and the matter was taken under
advisement by the Commission. <<Note 3 - Oral arguments were
delayed 30 minutes and when Respondent did not appear, her
presence was expressly waived by her counsel.>>



                B.
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

        At the Formal Hearing, Commission counsel called the
Respondent for cross-examination; presented twenty-nine (29)
witnesses; and introduced thirty-seven (37) exhibits. ("JQC
Ex. "). Respondent testified in her own behalf; presented
twenty-four (24) witnesses; and introduced ten (10) exhibits.
("Vaughn Ex. ").

        The formal charges in this matter arose principally
from Respondent's conduct in seven (7) different cases, as
well as her conduct in dealing with various court officials
and personnel. Evidence supporting the acts of misconduct
alleged in each case was presented, and is perhaps best
summarized in a series of hypothetical questions answered by
Chief Judge Charles L. Carnes of the State Court of Fulton
County. Judge Carnes, a veteran jurist who has served as
Chief Judge since December 1981, testified as an expert
witness respecting each of the seven cases involved in this
proceeding, and seven (7) times expressed the opinion that
Respondent's proven conduct did not evidence that degree of
professional competence required by the Code of Judicial
Conduct and reasonably expected of any judge of the State
Court of Fulton County. (FHT 1173 - 1203). The record is
devoid of evidence contradicting this expert opinion and such
testimony stands unrefuted.

        Without detailing all of the testimony, suffice it to
say that the following conduct was proven by clear and
convincing evidence:

        The case of Clark v. Payne gave rise to the complaint
of Hunter S. Allen, Esq. (R. 1-155), and a complete
transcript of this five (5) week trial is included in the
record. (JQC. Ex 35). This was a major medical malpractice
action in which Respondent, who had been on the bench for
some (5) years, engaged in the following activities:

1. Failed and refused to timely address critical legal issues
raised by a settlement between some of the parties
immediately prior to the beginning of voir dire examination
although repeatedly requested to do so by counsel (FHT 277 -
287; 1241 - 1244; 1264; 1268; 1284 - 1291);

2. failed and refused to rule upon motions on a timely basis
(FHT 279 - 283), specifically including an agreed-upon motion
to sever a cross-complaint filed against one of the settling
defendants thereby requiring the attorney for the settling
defendant to unnecessarily remain in attendance at the trial
for the better portion of a week (FHT 423), leaving said
attorney in what he described as "sort of a legal limbo" (FHT
426 - 427);

3. required all attorneys to communicate with the Court
solely by way of handwritten notes submitted to her law clerk
(FHT 287 - 291; JQC Ex 1, 9)) and thereafter responded with
vague, uncertain and indefinite answers and on at least one
occasion never answered (FHT 1253 1260; 1272 -1273) -- a
practice which prompted the Superior Court Judge presiding in
this hearing to pose the following question to Attorney
Allen:

"... did anyone ... stand up and say, Judge, there is
something nutty going on here. We are trying to communicate
with you and all we get are these vague writings from this
law clerk - is this what you want? Did anybody say anything
like that?" (FHT 289)

4. frequently interrupted the jury trial for the purpose of
hearing other unrelated non-jury matters thereby delaying the
conclusion of the trial (FHT 296 - 297);

5. regularly allowed her law clerk to disperse the jury
during jury deliberations; gave no cautionary instructions to
the jury when it was dispersed; and sailed to advise or
otherwise notify the attorneys that the jury was being
dispersed (FHT 294 - 296);

6. left the courthouse during jury deliberations without
making arrangements for another judge to be available if
needed (FHT 303, JQC Ex 9-10);

7. frequently suspended jury deliberations (which were being
conducted in the courtroom) in order that the courtroom could
be used for unrelated non-jury matters (FHT 351 - 354);

8. gave the jury an "ALLEN" charge and after only 2-1/2 hours
of deliberation excused the jury for a three-day weekend (FHT
301; JQC Ex 10); and

9. failed to advise counsel at any time prior to the
declaration of a mistrial of written communications received
from the jury during eight (8) days of deliberations and
permitted and/or otherwise directed her clerk to withhold
information concerning such inquiries from counsel (FHT 305 -
309, 405, 412; JQC Ex 5, 12).

        Experienced and competent trial lawyers involved in the
unnecessarily protracted trial of this case characterized
various portions of Respondent's conduct as:

(a) "so far outside the spectrum of the norm that I felt it
should be scrutinized by someone other than me" (FHT 311 -
312); "Alice in Wonderland" (FHT 338); and "bizarre" (FHT 338
- 339);

(b) "with no guidance whatsoever (from the Court) and not
knowing what avenue to pursue (FHT 434); and

(c) "... a very awkward and difficult process (which) did not
work well at all." (FHT 1292).

        A criminal case State v. Julian Reeder gave rise to the
complaint of Mr. Julian Reeder, a criminal misdemeanor
defendant. (R. 172 - 182). In this case, the defendant
appeared in Respondent's court on April 20, 1993, at the time
scheduled by the Court, and announced that his attorney was
absent with a sick child. (FHT 599). The defendant's request
to reschedule was refused by Respondent (FHT 599, 667 - 668);
a subsequent request to reschedule made by the legal
assistant to Mr. Reeder's attorney was summarily rejected
(FHT 656, 667 - 668); and in a subsequent telephone
conversation, Reeder's attorney was advised that Respondent
was demanding that he be in court by 1:00 P.M. that day ready
to try the case. (FHT 656 - 658).

        However, prior to the arrival of Reeder's attorney,
Respondent called the Reeder case and demanded that Reeder go
forward with his trial without his attorney. Reeder refused
to proceed, was ordered to stay in court, and told that his
bond would be forfeited. (FHT 601 - 604)

        In the meantime, Timothy Herring, Reeder's attorney,
arrived in Respondent's courtroom at approximately 1:12 P.M.
to find Respondent off the bench and his client sitting in
the jury box. Upon inquiry, Mr. Herring discovered that in
spite of the representations made by his assistant that he
would be in court by 1:00 P.M., Respondent had nevertheless
called his client's case for trial at 12:30 P.M., and when
his client refused to go forward, stating his right to
counsel, Respondent forfeited his bond and told him to have a
seat in the jury box. (FHT 667 - 670). Herring's subsequent
requests to discuss the matter with Respondent were summarily
rejected, and Respondent called a jury to begin another
trial. (FHT 670 -672).

        Herring's final attempt to speak to Respondent occurred
when she came to the bench to begin the other trial. It
likewise failed, and Respondent's conduct is described by
Herring as follows: "She just turned away, said nothing, gave
no explanation, wouldn't talk to me about my client or the
fact he was there or I was there or why I was being forced to
come in when they didn't have to try my case, at which time
she ordered my client to move from the jury box, have a seat
in the front row." (FHT 673).

        Reeder remained in court until it was adjourned at 5:00
P.M., was not taken into custody nor given a date to return.
(FHT 623, 605, 674). Six (6) days later, Respondent signed a
bench warrant ordering Reeder's arrest for failure to appear.
(FHT 677). Thereafter, Reeder was arrested and required to
post a new bond although he had been in court the entire day.
(FHT 606 - 607).

        Approximately two (2) months later, Herring was advised
by a Fulton County officer that his client, Julian Reeder,
had been arrested on a bench warrant for his nonappearance on
April 20, 1993. (FHT 607, 675; JQC Ex 20, 21). Herring's
subsequent efforts to retrieve the case file from
Respondent's office were denied with Respondent stating in
the presence of her calendar clerk, law clerk and secretary,
"We can't help you now." (FHT 676 - 677).

        After verifying that the warrant had indeed been issued
and that Respondent was the judge who had issued the warrant,
Herring filed a motion to recuse respondent and again
returned to Respondent's office some two days later to
request the case file. At that time, Respondent again came
out of her office, gathered her whole staff into the office,
and said, "We can't help you now." (FHT 676-677).

        Herring's frustration is perhaps best summarized in the
following excerpt:

Q. (by Mr. Finley): Mr. Herring, when you arrived late and
the Judge had rescheduled another trial, do you think that
was improper?

A: The only thing I knew that she knew for sure was I told
her, I told her I would be there at 1:00 o'clock to try a
case that she had told my client and legal assistant better
be tried today and I had better be there to try, and by God,
I was there and she knew I was coming and she wasn't on the
bench. So that's all I know she knew for sure, James, but I
was going to be there when she told me I had to be there. I
was complying with the order of the Court as hard as I could
go from 35 miles, taking care of my baby, getting my wife off
work, cleaning myself and my child up, giving her to my wife,
grabbing the file, grabbing some jury charges, and coming on
as quick as I could. I figured if she had been on the bench
at 1:00, she could have known that, but she wasn't on the
bench so I don't know what she was thinking." (FHT 685-686).

        Another criminal case, State v. Marcus Adams, gave rise
to the complaint of Rees R. Smith, Esq. (R. 164-169).
Respondent's calendar clerk announced in open court that the
defendant's lawyer had a conflict and would be a little late.
(FHT 1454, 1488; JQC Ex 19). The defendant himself appeared
ten minutes late and the lawyer arrived approximately 15 to
20 minutes late. The lawyer tried to make his presence known,
but was told by Respondent on two (2) occasions to sit down
and not get back up. Respondent did not call the calendar
again for the benefit of those attorneys and defendants who
were late and began striking a jury for the trial of another
case. (FHT 489- 492).

        When Adams' attorney returned to Respondent's courtroom
at approximately noon, he discovered that a mistrial had been
declared in the case which had been put on trial earlier in
the day and that Respondent had left the courthouse. Because
of the reputation of this particular division of the State
Court concerning bond forfeitures (FHT 494), Adams' attorney
prepared and subsequently filed a motion to set aside a bond
forfeiture (JQC Ex 18). A copy of this motion to set aside
bond forfeiture was delivered to Respondent's chambers, but
Respondent had left the courthouse. (FHT 495 - 496).

        Subsequently, a warrant was issued for Mr. Adams, but
he was not arrested when the arresting officers were shown a
certified copy of the motion to set aside the bond
forfeiture. (FHT 497).

        When asked why he ultimately filed a complaint with the
Commission, Attorney Smith responded as follows:

Well, that complaint was filed after a lot of this took place
and ... for years I have had a thing about lawyers'
responsibility to each other and the bar and people that
complain about judges and don't file complaints and people
that complain about other lawyers and don't file complaints.
It bothers me, like people who complain about elected
officials and don't bother to vote. For about 15 years I have
sat on Judicial Qualifications Commissions of the Atlanta Bar
and other bars, and I tried to convince my colleagues, if you
think that they are not qualified, bite the bullet and say
so, don't dance around the subject. Well, this is not the
same thing, but yet I felt it was my responsibility to file a
complaint. (FHT 500).

        In yet another criminal case, State v. Otis Williams,
the defendant answered "present" when his name was called and
informed Respondent that his lawyer would be late. Respondent
ignored his statement and demanded that the defendant plead
either guilty or not guilty without awaiting the arrival of
his lawyer and without appointing counsel to represent the
defendant. (FHT 717 - 718, 734). Respondent further required
the defendant, Without the benefit of counsel, to fill out a
guilty plea form (JQC Ex 23) and was prepared to take his
guilty plea when his lawyer appeared in court and was allowed
to stop the entering of the guilty plea. However, the lawyer
was informed that if she did not place her client on a plea
calendars his bond would be forfeited and in order to avoid
such forfeiture, the attorney placed the defendant's case on
the plea calendar. Prior to the above-described occurrences,
the attorney had called Respondent's office and requested
that this case be held for her report due to the fact that
she was going to be in Atlanta City Traffic Court and would
be reporting to Respondent's Court as soon as possible. (FHT
720-721; 730 - 741).

        In yet another criminal case, State v. Nowacki, the
attorney for the defendant filed an entry of appearance; a
plea of not guilty; and a demand for jury trial, (FHT 921
927; JQC Ex 28, 29). Upon receipt of notice, the lawyer and
the defendant came to a non-jury calendar call, announced
their presence, and requested a jury trial. (FHT 927).
Respondent stated she desired to have a hearing to decide
whether the defendant could have a jury trial in criminal
misdemeanor case and required the defendant to remain in
court all day while she considered that issue. (FHT 910 -
912, 928). Respondent instructed the attorney and the
defendant to come back the next day because she was still
considering whether the defendant had a right to a trial by
jury. (FHT 929).

        When the attorney and defendant returned the next day,
Respondent apologized to the lawyer and said she did not
realize at what point he became involved in the case. (FHT
929.

        A fourth criminal case, State v. Tarkenton, gave rise
to the complaint of William C. Head, Esq. (R. 215-218), and a
complete transcript of this trial is included in the record
(JQC Ex 37). In this case, the defendant was convicted in
Respondent's court on a DUI charge on August 23, 1993. (FHT
940). Thereafter, defendant's attorney filed a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and later a motion for
new trial. (FHT 942-943; JQC Ex 31, 32). Over a year later,
on September 12, 1994, the defendant and her lawyer appeared
in Respondent's Court, and when Respondent realized that
defendant had not ever been sentenced for the August 23, 1993
conviction, she decided to impose sentence at
that time. The lawyer objected, stating that he did not have
reasonable notice, wanted an opportunity read the probation
report, and present witnesses to the Court. Respondent denied
the request to reschedule the sentencing and summarily
sentenced the defendant to twelve months in jail and a
$1,000.00 fine.

        Immediately upon imposing the sentence, Respondent got
up and abruptly left the bench and the courtroom. (FHT 946 -
949). The lawyer immediately submitted in open court a Notice
of Appeal (JQC Ex 33) and requested a supersedeas bond,
asking Respondent's calendar clerk to convey to Respondent
his request for a reasonable bond. The clerk later returned
to the courtroom, announced in open court that Respondent
would consider the bond only after the lawyer had obtained a
stamped copy of the Notice of Appeal from the Clerk's Office.
The lawyer complied with this request, immediately returned
to the courtroom with a stamped copy of the Notice of Appeal
(JQC Ex 33), and waited for Respondent to return to the
bench. Respondent never returned to the bench, and the
defendant was subsequently taken into custody. (FHT 949-
954).

        The following day, another lawyer hired by the
defendant's original lawyer, returned to the court and tried
to follow up with Respondent to secure a reasonable bond.
This second attorney went to Respondent's courtroom, but she
refused to see him or discuss the issue of bond. (FHT 979-
983). Realizing that he would not be able to see Respondent,
this attorney attempted to file an emergency appeal with the
Court of Appeals, but was unable to do so because Respondent
had all the necessary papers concerning the defendant's case
in her  chambers. On the next day, the second lawyer, using
an affidavit  indicating that the necessary papers were in
Respondent's possession  (JQC Ex 34), filed an emergency
appeal to the Court of Appeals seeking  a supersedeas bond,
and an Order was entered by the Court of Appeals on
September 14, 1994 directing Respondent to set a reasonable
bond  pending appeal instanter. (FHT 983 - 985; JQC Ex 4). As
a result of  this order, Respondent finally agreed to set
bond after the defendant  was unlawfully confined and
deprived of his freedom for two (2) full  days in a criminal
misdemeanor case. (FHT 958-959). It is to be noted  that
these events occurred only two (2) days following the
issuance of  an identical order by the Court of Appeals
directing the Respondent to  set a reasonable bond pending
appeal in State v. Park (JQC Ex 26), yet another criminal
misdemeanor case. (FHT 935 - 986).

        A final criminal case, State v. Park, gave rise to the
complaint of Robert W. Chestney, Esq. (R. 196 - 212), and a
complete  transcript of this trial is included in the record.
(JQC Ex 36).  Without detailing all of the evidence,
Respondent's conduct can be  summarized as follows:

1. Excused the State's witnesses and announced that a  motion
hearing was being rescheduled due to the  failure of Mr.
Park's attorney to appear although Mr.  Park was present the
entire time and advised the  court that his attorney was
appearing in another court and irrespective of the fact that
Park's attorney had previously provided a "conflict letter"
to Respondent's Court (JQC Ex. 25) and requested the calendar
clerk for the judge in whose court he was trying a case to
telephone Respondent's clerk during that trial to announce
the attorney's presence in the other court (FHT 781-782);
<<Note 4 - As Judge Carnes testified, the Judges of the State
Court of Fulton County do not customarily require the filing
of a formal "Notice of Appearance" and/or "Conflicts Letter"
because "we have lawyers that practice all over the
metropolitan area ... and they call and I hold the for the
report." (FHT 1182).>>

2. participated in ex parte communications with an Assistant
Solicitor concerning a motion to dismiss the defendant's
demand for a speedy trial and a continuance due to the
inability of the State to produce a critical witness (FHT
787, 798);

3. personally told Park's attorney that a hearing on a State
motion to dismiss the defendant's demand for speedy trial
(JQC Ex 24) would be held on September 15, '994 at 9:00 A.M.
Despite such advice, Respondent called the Park case for
trial at 9:00 A.M. on September 1, 1994 and refused to
discuss the lack of adequate notice with the attorney. When
the case was called for trial, the attorney refused to answer
and protested the scheduling of a criminal jury trial without
seven days' written notice as required by the Uniform Local
Rules and pointed out to Respondent that the defendant was
being denied his right to effective assistance of counsel and
his right to compulsory attendance of witnesses. Respondent
nevertheless forced the attorney to proceed with jury
selection and then recessed the case until 1:00 P.M. the
following day because the State was missing a material
witness (JQC Ex 2);

4. the next day, the Assistant Solicitor called Park's
attorney from Respondent's chambers to advise that she was
requesting that Respondent not start the trial of the Park
case, but put it over until after the Labor Day weekend. (FHT
798). Subsequently, Respondent got on the phone and informed
the attorney that "the Park case will be recessed until
September 9, 1994 at 9:00 o'clock and that's that." (FHT 798
- 799)

5. refused to discuss the defendant's motion for discharge
and acquittal for failure to try the case before the end of
the August term (JQC Ex 3) with another lawyer from the
office of the attorney representing the defendant;

6. forced another attorney from the office of the defendant's
initial attorney to go to trial totally unprepared in the
absence of the original attorney at a time when a Notice of
Appeal had been filed. JQC Ex 27). When this attorney
attempted to object to the trial going forward, Respondent
announced loudly that any statement he made other than an
opening statement to the jury would be "out of order." (FHT
851). Having twice been told that anything he said would be
out of line, this attorney's impression was:
        My impression was we are about to be shotgunned into a
trial. This shouldn't be happening. There has been no ruling
on an outstanding motion as we had anticipated that a direct
appeal would lie from that ruling. I had the direct appeal in
my hand. I need to tell the Judge that and I am not allowed
to speak. (FHT 852).

7. sentenced the defendant to serve six months in jail, and
after an immediate filing of a Notice of Appeal (JQC Ex 27),
refused to set an appeal bond on a misdemeanor conviction;

8. refused to discuss the unlawful detention of the defendant
with the original counsel, refused to allow this counsel to
be heard, and left the bench without granting an appeal bond;

9. allowed a criminal misdemeanor defendant to remain
illegally incarcerated for approximately four (4) days (FHT
805 - 810, 858);

10. telephone the Clerk of the Court of Appeals after
receiving an emergency order directing her to set a
reasonable bond to inquire how quickly she must do so (FHT
876 - 880); and

11. waited approximately 24 hours to set a reasonable bond
pending appeal, after having been ordered to do so
immediately as a result of an emergency motion filed in the
Georgia Court of Appeals. (FHT 779 - 859; 876 - 880; JQC Ex
26).

        In addition to above-described conduct, the evidence
also demonstrates that Respondent has consistently acted in
an unprofessional and discourteous manner toward court
personnel by repeatedly making unfounded, improper and
unwarranted allegations of misconduct against solicitors,
clerks, secretaries and administrators. (FHT 1004 - 1061;
1063 1108; 1110 - 1132; 1132 - 1149). Among other things, a
female assistant solicitor testified: "In my opinion, I was
treated inappropriately and in an unprofessional manner
because of the demeaning ways in which Judge Vaughn addressed
me and not just me but others in the courtroom." (FHT 1065 -
1079). This same witness, testifying on cross-examination,
said: "(she) was mean to everybody --- that is the way it
appeared to everyone in the courtroom." (FHT 1081). Another
court employee testified that Respondent was "rude" (FHT
1112) and the Court Administrator concluded his detailed
testimony about his strained relationship with Respondent by
stating: "She doesn't do her job, she wants to do everybody
else's job .... She is constantly keeping the whole system in
an uproar, the whole system in turmoil ...." (FHT 1028).

        In the face of the above detailed evidence, Respondent
offers little or no evidence except for self-serving blanket
denials. Her evasive, equivocal and unresponsive testimony,
particularly when called for cross-examination, (FHT 112 -
272), and her responses to questions propounded by the
Commission at the conclusion of the evidence (FHT 1671 -
1701), fail to adequately refute, and in some cases even
address, the sworn testimony of witnesses presented by
counsel for the Commission. Additionally, Respondent refuses
to acknowledge that any specific action was improper and
accepts little, if any, personal responsibility for the
difficulties she experienced with the numerous individuals
testifying against her in this matter. (FHT 1686 - 1696). Her
exchange with Dr. Barbara Carter is illustrative:

Q. Judge Vaughn, in regard to all of the matters that have
come before us, I guess my question is, where, if at all, do
you think that you may have exercised poor judgment in the
operation of your court and in the exercise of your authority
as a judge? I would just be interested in hearing your
response.

A. If there is anything that I could answer you directly on
and that is in terms of my mannerisms in the courtroom,
mannerisms that I didn't realize was having such an effect on
people, my tone of voice, my facial expressions, just in that
kind of -- those kind of conversations or expressions I think
could very easily have affected people and I didn't realize
how much so until we started having these hearings. That
certainly would be one thing, the first thing that would come
to mind.

Q. Are there others?

A. I am sure there would be others. I could think of some
other things but this would be the main thing.
(FHT 1697 - 1698).

        In sum, Respondent's conduct as alleged in the Notice
of Formal Proceedings, has been clearly established and
necessitates the Findings and Conclusions hereinafter set
forth.

C.
FINDINGS

        Using the Notice of Formal Proceedings as an outline
(R. 222 - 228), and after considering all the evidence and
arguments of counsel, this Commission makes and enters the
following Findings:

        Charge and each subparagraph thereof has been proven by
clear and convincing evidence except those relating to
Swanson v. Bloodworth; Brown v. Wackenhut Corporation; Womack
v. Brown; and State v. Ford, as to which no evidence was
offered. (FHT 1330). Additional misconduct occurring in State
v. Otis Lee Williams has similarly been proven. (FHT 729 -
755).

II.

        Charge II and each subparagraph thereof has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence except those related to
Arnold Wright, Jr.; J. Blair Craig, II; Elaine Whitehurst;
and Dennis J. Webb, as to which no evidence was offered. (FHT
1330). Additional misconduct involving attorney Kristina
Gladden has similarly been proven. (FHT 729 - 755).

III.

        Charge III and each subparagraph thereof has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence except those relating
to S. William Kelley (as to which no evidence was offered)
and John W. Stokes (whose testimony was stricken on motion).
(FHT 1004; 1330).

IV.

        Charge IV has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.

V.

        Charge V and each subparagraph thereof has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence except those relating to
Swanson v. Bloodworth and Glomski v. City of Atlanta, as to
which no evidence was offered. (FHT 1330). Additional
misconduct occurring in the case of State v. Otis Lee
Williams has been similarly proven. (FHT 729 - 755).

II.

        Such proven conduct constitutes irresponsible and
improper judicial activity which adversely affects the
administration of Respondent's office, as well as the rights
and interests of the public, and evidences a clear violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canons 1, 2 and 3
thereof in particular. <<Note 5 - In general terms, Canon 1
requires judges to personally observe high standards of
conduct so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved.
        Canon 2 requires respect and compliance with the law
and conduct which promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary; and
        Canon 3 requires faithfulness to the law and
professional competence in it; patience, dignity and courtesy
to persons with whom they deal in their official capacity;
the right to be heard to every person ... or that person's
lawyer ... while forbidding initiation or consideration of ex
parte communications; and fair, efficient and prompt
disposition of all judicial matters.

VII.

        The conduct here proven, as well as the applicable
authorities, demands sanctions of a most severe nature.

D.

CONCLUSIONS

        The evidence in this record, especially the compelling
and uncontradicted testimony of Chief Judge Charles L.
Carnes, regrettably reveals a judge who has failed to be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in
it; failed to be patient, dignified and courteous to
litigants, lawyers, and others with whom she deals in her
official capacity; considered and acted upon ex parte
communications relating to substantive matters; and failed to
fairly, promptly and efficiently dispose of the business of
the Court.

        Such failures, when combined with undisputed patterns
of repeated legal error; indecorous and discourteous
behavior; refusal to communicate; and unexplained absences,
reflect adversely on the judiciary; undermine public
confidence in the impartial functioning of judicial officers;
and clearly warrant a finding of unbecoming conduct
sufficient to impose sanctions of a most severe nature.

        Well-reasoned precedent requires the same result. As
aptly stated by the Judicial Council of the United States:

The robe a judge wears as he (she) sits upon the bench is not
a license to excoriate lawyers or anyone else. In Re Perkins
No. 88-372-001, 1, (Dec. 27, 1988).

        In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
noted:

An intoxication with judicial power which would ignore basic
constitutional precepts is a wholly unacceptable syndrome
that cannot be tolerated .... To brook it in a single
courtroom would not only degrade the courts in general but
would affront the vast majority of ... judges who perceive
their courtroom as places of justice rather than arenas for
exhibitionism by display, before an intimidated audience, of
naked and illegal judicial power. In Re Yengo, 72 N.J. 425,
371 A.2d 41 (1977).

        In a 1991 decision, the New York Court of Appeals noted
that the Respondent's "pattern of conduct" presented a
picture of an unfair system for litigants and had
"irredeemably damaged public confidence in the integrity of
his Court." In Re Esworthy, 77 N.Y. 2d 280, 568 N.E. 2d 1195,
567 N.Y.S. 390, 391.

        And in 1993 the Florida Supreme Court has stated that:
"... a judgeship is a position of trust, not a fiefdom." In
Re Graham, 620 So. 2d. 1273, 1277.

        Finally, this Court recently upheld a recommendation of
removal from office in a case involving proven judicial
misconduct far less egregious than that present in this
record, Inquiry Concerning Judge #94-70 (decided March 17,
1995), and in an earlier case, permanently barred a Senior
Judge from active judicial service for a demonstrated pattern
of willful misconduct which included, among other things,
intemperate, discourteous and injudicious language. Inquiry
Concerning a Judge, 407 S.E. 2d 743 (1991).

        Measured by these standards, Respondent's proven
Conduct Can only be described as a flagrant abuse and/or
misuse of the power and prestige of judicial office in a
unsuccessful attempt to mask a professional incompetence
rarely seen in judges of her age and experience. Simply
stated, a sitting judge with five (5) years' experience does
not:

(i) fail to promptly rule on critical issues;

(ii) require counsel to communicate with the court solely by
way of written communications to a law clerk;

(iii) allow the jury to be repeatedly dispersed by a law
clerk with no cautionary instructions;

(iv) fail to timely advise counsel of numerous written
communications received from the jury during nine (9) days of
deliberations;

(v) deny criminal defendants liberty and freedom guaranteed
by the Constitution;

(vi) force defendants to enter guilty pleas in the absence of
counsel;

(vii) advise defendants that the only way they can get out of
bond forfeiture is by going on a guilty plea calendar;

(viii) repeatedly fail to treat lawyers, litigants and court
personnel with the dignity and respect which the Code of
Judicial Conduct demands; or

(ix) abruptly leave the bench, "barricade" herself in
chambers, and absolutely refuse to communicate with counsel
about matters of urgent concern.

More importantly:

A judge who refuses to recognize his own transgressions does
not deserve the authority or command the respect necessary to
judge the transgressions of others. We are troubled by the
fact that [the judge] shows no remorse and we can only
presume that if this Court reprimanded him, he would continue
to violate the precepts of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See:
In re Trettis, 577 So. 2d. 1312 (Fla. 1991) (When a Judge
continuously acts in a manner that undermines public
confidence, removal may be required.) Graham, Id @ 1276.

E.

RECOMMENDATION

        Conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary may be
proved by evidence of specific major incidents which indicate
such Conduct, or it may also be proved by evidence of an
accumulation of small and ostensibly innocuous incidents
which, when considered together, emerge as a pattern of
hostile conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary. Graham
at 1275, quoting In Re Kelly, 238 So.2d 565, 569.

        In either event, the facts here proven conclusively
evidence conduct which simply cannot be Condoned.
Unfortunately, Respondent shows neither an understanding of
nor a remorse for her numerous acts of misconduct and gives
absolutely no indication of either an intent or a desire to
Change. Accordingly, the Commission is left little option. A
private reprimand is clearly inappropriate, and a public
reprimand, even with a lengthy suspension from office, does
not appear likely to alleviate the recurring problems.
Furthermore, Respondent's established behavior was willful
and persistent; clearly inconsistent with the proper
performance of her judicial duties; and obviously brings the
judiciary into disrepute.

        Fully recognizing that the object of disciplinary
proceedings is not to inflict punishment, but to determine
whether one who exercises judicial power is unfit to hold a
judgeship [Kelly, supra), it is the unanimous conclusion of
this Commission that Respondent is unfit to hold judicial
office. Such a conclusion demands sanctions of a most severe
nature, and accordingly, it is the unpleasant responsibility
of this Commission to recommend that Respondent be removed
from office instanter.

This 26th  day of May, 1995.

JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION
John E. James, Chair
Jerry B. Blackstock
Dr. Barbara Carter
Charles A. Harris
Judge Hugh Lawson
Bob Reinhardt
Judge Walter C. McMillan, Jr.
(Sitting by Designation)


---------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX A





BEFORE THE COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE #94-8, 94-64, 94-74,
95-44 AND 95-56

NOTICE OF FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

        This is to notify you that the Judicial Qualifications
Commission has concluded that formal proceedings should be
instituted for the purpose of determining whether you
committed the acts enumerated below and, if so, whether you
were guilty of willful misconduct in office or conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the
judicial office into disrepute:

        Whether you have on various occasions acted in an
undignified, arrogant, intemperate, rude and/or discourteous
manner toward litigants, attorneys and others appearing in
your Court, specifically including, but not limited to, the
following matters:

A. Clark v. Payne, et al., Case No. 256315;

B. State v. Marcus Clinton Adams, Case No. 130483;

C. State v. Julian G. Reeder, Case No. 123088;

D. Swanson v. Joseph Heath Bloodworth, Case No. 94A86308-4;

E. Brown v Wackenhut Corporation and Hall County;

F. Cjarita Womack v Dr. C. William Brown et al.;

G. State v. Carol Nowacki;

H. State v Patrick Ford, Case No. 143204;

        APPENDIX A

I. State v. Angela D. Tarkenton, case No. 93-2-131100; and

J. State v. Milton Park, Case No. 143204

        Whether you have misused and/or abused the powers of
your office by engaging in a pattern of hostile conduct
toward litigants, lawyers and others appearing in your Court
and, in so doing, demonstrated a serious lack of judicial
temperament, specifically including, but not limited to, the
following individuals:

A. Hunter S. Allen, Jr., Attorney at Law;
B. Reese R. Smith, Attorney at Law;
C. Timothy Herring, Attorney at Law;
D. Robert W. Chestney, Attorney at Law;
E. Carol Nowacki;
F. Arnold Wright, Jr., Attorney at Law;
G. J. Blair Craig, II, Attorney at Law;
H. Elaine Whitehurst, Attorney at Law;
I. Barry M. Hazen, Attorney at Law;
J. Dennis J. Webb, Attorney at Law;
K. William R. Reese, III, Attorney at Law;
L. Julian George Reeder;
M. Helen Ward;
N. Marcus Clint Adams;
O. Dr. Kenneth Braunstein;
P. Patrick Ford;
Q. Angela D. Tarkenton; and
R. William C. Head.

III.

        Whether you have used your position to make unfounded
and improper allegations of misconduct and unfair criticisms
of certain support personnel assigned to your office,
specifically including, but not limited to, the following
individuals:

A. Oliver E. Murray, Assistant Solicitor, Fulton County State
Court;

B. Rita Bembry, Deputy Clerk, State Court of Fulton County;

C. Loretta Lynn Nails, Calendar Clerk, State Court of Fulton
County;

D. Ella Jemison Cooks, former secretary to Judge Dorothy J.
Vaughn;

E. Faye I. McCormack, Assistant Solicitor, State Court of
Fulton County;

F. Robert E. Cochran, II, Administrator, State Court of
Fulton County;

G. S. William Kelley, Calendar Clerk, State Court of Fulton
County; and

H. John W. Stokes, former Assistant Solicitor, State Court of
Fulton county.

IV.

        Whether you have failed to fairly, promptly, and
efficiently dispose of the business of the Court by
repeatedly failing to timely appear at the hour designated
for the opening of Court; by repeatedly being late when
returning from "breaks"; by requiring counsel to communicate
with the Court only by way of written communications and
thereafter either ignoring, delaying or otherwise failing to
timely respond to such required communications; by
interrupting and delaying an ongoing trial to hear unrelated
and nonessential matters; by unexpectedly and abruptly
leaving your courtroom and, in some instances, the State
Court Building during a trial without advising counsel or
litigants of your intentions or whereabouts; and by absenting
yourself from your office and duties for extended, and
sometimes unannounced, periods of time on various occasions
during the years 1992 through 1994, thereby necessitating the
appointment of substitute judges to perform the duties of
your office.

V.

        Whether you have been faithful to the law and
maintained professional competence in it in your handling of
matters coming before your Court, specifically including, but
not limited to, the following matters:

A. Clark v. Payne, Case No. 256315;

B. State v. Marcus Clinton Adams, Case No. 130483;

C. State v. Julian G. Reeder, Case No. 123088;

D. Swanson v. Joseph Heath Bloodworth; Case No. 94A86308-4;

E. Glomski v. City of Atlanta, Case No 171760-3;

F. State v. Angela D. Tarkenton, Case No. 93-2-13100; and

G. State v Milton Park, Case No 143204.

VI.

        Whether such conduct, of any of it, constitutes
irresponsible or improper activity which adversely affects
the administration of your office, as well as the rights and
interests of the public.

VII.

        Whether such conduct, of any of it, has resulted in the
filing of numerous complaints with this Commission.

VIII.

        Whether such conduct, of any of it, constitutes a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canons 1, 2,
and 3 thereof in particular, for which you should be
appropriately sanctioned.

This 9th day of December, 1994.

JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION

By:
John E. James, Chair


ATTEST:
Earle B. May, Jr.
Director